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s with overall equity concerns, gender equality is important for both intrinsic
and instrumental reasons. It has a bearing on family harmony and on wellbeing
in many dimensions. It involves policy-making with respect to society as a whole,
i.a. education, labour and financial markets, economic and political empowerment,
institutions, and economic growth.
The prospects for achieving the Millennium Development Goals are both directly and
indirectly improved by enhancing gender equity. Thus, there are close links between
the reduction of both gender inequalities and multidimensional poverty. The empirical
evidence suggests that developing countries with less gender inequality tend to have
lower poverty rates.
Gender inequality represents an untapped source for stimulating economic growth and
promoting social development. This is particularly true in the developing world, where
women are often systematically deprived from having equal access to social services as
well as to physical and social capital. Hence, empowering women by improving their
living conditions and enabling them to actively participate in the social and economic
life of a country may well be the key for long-term sustainable development.
This issue of Poverty in Focus highlights the importance of improving gender equity for
pro-poor growth and improved wellbeing of poor families, with references to recent
research literature and sharing of important and policy-relevant results.
Naila Kabeer leads with a summary of current knowledge about the relation between
gender, labour markets and poverty, explaining why there are no easy generalisations
about the poverty implications of women’s paid work.
Gita Sen approaches poverty as a gendered experience that has to be addressed
with due consideration to its various impacts, responses and policy implications.
Joana Costa and Elydia Silva underline the burdens of gender inequalities for society
as a whole and show how paid work by women reduces overall poverty and inequality.
Denis Drechsler, Johannes Jütting and Carina Lindberg focus on the links between gender,
institutions and development; better data can help improve policy analysis.
James Heintz considers the ‘feminisation of labour’ that sees women concentrated in
lower quality, more precarious forms of paid work, increasing household vulnerability.
Ruth Alsop and Paul Healey find that gender inequality is a major barrier to economic growth
and poverty reduction, calling for bold policy action to challenge social institutions.
Andrew Morrison, Dhushyanth Raju and Nistha Sinha summarise a World Bank study showing
a robust relationship between gender inequality and poverty; poor women’s paid work
plays a key role in getting their families out of poverty.
John Sender presents data indicating that when women in rural Mozambique have
greater autonomy, daughters are less likely to be neglected; rural wages provide an
escape route from poverty for a new generation of women.
Ranjula Bali Swain and Fan Yang Wallentin use evidence from India that microfinance may
lead to increased empowerment, self-confidence, respect and esteem for women.
Irene K B Mutalima reports on the experience of microfinance in Africa and warns that
gender concerns often take a secondary role to the financial sustainability of the
credit instititutions.
Marcelo Medeiros and Joana Costa examine the claims of a ‘feminisation of poverty’ making
the distinction between static levels and dynamic change, and argue that current
poverty measure underestimate the real levels of women’s poverty.
Sylvia Chant also finds that the scant data on intra-household inequalities prevent
certain knowledge about the ‘feminisation of poverty’ and that the focus should be
on women’s privation beyond incomes.
This collection of articles should contribute to a better understanding of the importance
of recognising the crucial role of gender inequalities as barriers to economic and social
development, and thus of undertaking policy and institutional reforms that will more
effectively reduce poverty and social injustice.Poverty in Focus   January 2008    3
The pro-poor potential of labour-
intensive growth is based on the
recognition that labour power is the
primary asset at the disposal of the poor
and hence labour markets the key
transmission mechanism through which
the benefits of growth can be distributed
to the poor.
However, it is also premised on a number
of implicit, often unexamined, assumptions
about the ease with which the poor can
transform their labour into paid work
and paid work into improved levels of
livelihood, security and accumulation.
A gender analysis of labour and labour
markets suggests that this ‘transformation’
process not only cannot be taken for
granted but that it is also far more
problematic for women than for men
because of the existence of various
gender-related constraints.
These constraints relate to social norms
and values which govern the gender
division of labour in production and
reproduction in different regions of
the world. In general, these tend to
assign primary responsibility for the
reproduction and care of the family
to women and overall decision-making
authority to senior males, but allow
considerable variation in the roles and
responsibilities assigned to men
and women in the productive
efforts of the family.
Some regions have stricter constraints
than others, curtailing women’s mobility
in the public domain and confining
them to the domestic domain and
reproductive responsibilities. Women’s
lower than average rates of labour force
participation in South Asia and MENA
reflects widespread adherence to the
norms of female seclusion in these
regions; see the charts on pages 4 and 11.
Primary responsibility for care work
creates a close interdependency
between women’s activities and family
wellbeing. It explains why there is
greater life course variation in women’s
labour force participation than men’s,
particularly in more formalised
economies and occupations where
such responsibilities cannot be easily
combined with economic activity.
It explains why those who continue in
paid work through their reproductive
years are most likely to be found in
forms of self-employment or piece
work that allow greater flexibility
in the use of time. And it also explains
why women’s income, when they work,
is more likely to be allocated to the
welfare of their children.
These constraints mean that women
face greater difficulties than men in
translating their labour into paid work.
Moreover, they also face greater
difficulties in translating their paid
work into higher incomes, a reflection of
gender inequalities in the resources that
men and women bring to the labour
market. Gender norms and practices
tend to exacerbate the effects of scarcity
so that poor women enter the labour
market with lower levels of health,
nutrition, education and skills than poor
men and with fewer productive assets.
Gender differentials in pay and working
conditions partly reflect these gender
differentials in capital and capabilities.
Yet, women’s disadvantaged position
in the labour market also reflects the
combination of active discrimination and
unconscious biases that they encounter
from other market actors. Unfounded
beliefs about women’s aptitudes, skills
and dispositions, assumptions that all
women have mothering responsibilities
and widespread adherence to the
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Gender analyses of labour
markets suggest that it is
more difficult for women
than men to escape
poverty through paid
work and higher incomes.
Women face various
constraints related to
social norms and values
that govern the gender
division of labour in
production and
reproduction.
Yet, women have been
entering the labour market
in increasing numbers
at all age groups.
This has led many to
question the unfair division
of roles and responsibilities
within their homes.
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implications of increasing rates of female
labour force participation for the poverty
of women workers and their households?
And how does this phenomenon square
with claims about the growing
‘feminisation of poverty’1?
Cross-country regression analysis of the
relationship between economic growth
and gender equality indicate that
women’s labour market participation
plays an important role in mediating
this relationship but not automatically
or in expected ways.
For example,  a World Bank research
report in 1999 suggested that higher
levels of economic growth have been
associated with improvements in gender
equality as measured by women’s
secondary level education and life
expectancy relative to men and by the
legal recognition of women’s rights.
However, this positive effect only kicked
in for countries that had achieved lower
middle income levels. For countries
below this threshold, increases in per
capita GNP had little effect.
In addition, the report found that
countries with majority Hindu and
Muslim populations, which largely
correspond to the MENA region and
South Asia, reported lower than average
levels of gender equality.
As we noted, these are regions with lower
than average levels of female labour force
participation than others. However, it
should be noted that increasing levels of
both economic growth and female labour
force participation have failed to
‘normalise’ gender differentials in life
expectancy in the East Asian economies
of China, South Korea and Taiwan.
In India, the most adverse sex ratios
among children are reported by some
of its fastest growing states.
Gender discrimination in access to health
care and increasing resort to sex selective
abortions are leading to increasing
levels of excess female mortality among
children, to male-biased sex ratios at birth
and contributing to what Amartya Sen
calls the phenomenon of ‘missing women’.
The World Bank report also explored the
effects of gender equality on economic
growth, adjusting for the possibility of
simultaneous causality. They found that,
controlling for male education, increases
in female secondary education led
to increases in economic growth. Once
again, however, there was a threshold to
this effect: it only occurred in better off
countries in which female secondary
education represented at least 10 per cent
of the population.
The study suggested that this absence
of a relationship between gender equality
and economic growth in poorer countries
probably reflected the fact that returns to
formal education in less developed,
primarily agrarian economies were likely
to be restricted. Educational qualifications
tend to be used in these economies as
a primary screening mechanism in the
competition for scarce formal sector
employment, with gender acting as a
further form of screening, giving men
preferred access to these jobs.
Different kinds of gender discrimination
may come into play when women
become the preferred labour force
in the course of labour-intensive
industrialisation. The relationship
between gender equality and economic
growth in semi-industrialised, export-
oriented lower and middle income
economies has been explored by
Stephanie Seguino. She found that,
Source: Global employment trends for women by S. Elder and D. Schmidt.
Employment Strategy Paper No. 8, 2004   Geneva: ILO. @
the part of employers, state officials and
trade unions, regardless of the reality
on the ground, all serve to assigning
women to less well paid jobs or paying
them less than men. The consequences
of such behaviour shows up in findings
that gender differentials in wages cannot
be explained away by differentials in
education, skills, experience or location
in the labour market. There is an
unexplained residual which reflects
gender discrimination.
Women have been entering the labour
market in increasing numbers at all age
groups. The employment elasticity of
growth in recent decades has been higher
for women than men in most regions of
the world as shown in the table. This
poses interesting questions.
If labour markets are indeed the key
transmission mechanism through which
the benefits of economic growth are
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controlling for male secondary education,
female education was positively
associated with economic growth. It also
made a stronger contribution over time
than did male education.
She also found that countries with higher
levels of gender inequality in wages
reported higher levels of economic growth.
This relationship held, even when the
gender wage gap measure had been
adjusted for educational differentials.
Labour-intensive growth in these
countries was the product of specialisation
in the manufacture of commodities with
highly price-elastic demand so that profit
levels reflected the ability to keep labour
costs low. The preference for women
as the primary labour force in these
industries reflected the existence of a
gender wage gap, even for more educated
workers. This phenomenon has been
dubbed ‘the comparative advantage
of women’s disadvantage’.
Has the preference for female labour
in processes of globally-competitive,
labour-intensive industrialisation led
to a gradual improvement of women’s
position in the labour market, as models
of the labour market would predict?
Support for this hypothesis is to be
found in evidence from cross-country
regression analysis that increased trade
and FDI net flows have led to a fall in
gender wage gaps, mainly among lower
skilled occupations and hence among
the working poor.
However, there are a number of reasons
why this cannot be taken as prima facie
evidence of reductions in female poverty.
First of all, cross-country findings are
not always consistent with in-country
findings. Time series data tells us that the
last 40 years since economic take off in
the East Asian economies of Taiwan and
South Korea have seen women’s wages
and income levels grow in absolute terms,
but the overall gender wage gap remains
large. It began to decline in the 1990s with
the passage of gender equality legislation
in Korea but has widened in Taiwan where
there has been no equivalent legislation.
And as we noted, rising female incomes
have not eradicated discrimination
against daughters.
1. See below, pages 24-27.
2. See below, page 26.
Secondly, reductions in gender wage
gaps cannot, on their own, tell us a great
deal about either female or household
poverty. Women and men do not
generally participate in the labour
market as individual earners but as
family breadwinners. It is difficult to
generalise about the poverty of either
without taking account of the existence
and extent of all contributions to
household income.
If, as seems to be the case in some
regions, women have gained access to
labour markets in a period when male
wages have declined sharply or male
employment is declining or stagnating,
the positive income effect
of women’s access to paid work is
likely to be offset by the loss or decline
in male earnings.
Nor is it clear that increased access to
paid work by women will translate into
improvements in family wellbeing if
women’s increased workloads in the
market are not accompanied by a
commensurate increase in men’s
share of unpaid domestic labour2.
The overwhelming evidence from across
the world suggests that this increase
has not occurred and that the main
burden of adjustment has fallen on
poorer working women who cannot
afford to pay for domestic help. Some
have coped by increasing their working
hours, with adverse consequences
for their own wellbeing. Others have
relied on their older children, usually
daughters, to look after younger
children, often at the expense of the
former’s educational prospects. Still
others have taken their children to
work with them in fields, roadsides
and market place.
1991-1995 1995-1999 1999-2003
Male 0.30 0.34 0.29
Female 0.40 0.44 0.33
GDP growth 2.9% 3.6% 3.5%
Global employment elasticities by sex
Source: The employment intensity of growth: trends and macroeconomic determinants by S. Kapsos.
Employment Strategy Paper No. 12, 2005. Geneva: ILO. @
Women’s increased access to paid work
has also allowed many to question the
unfair division of roles and responsibilities
within their homes. The rising number
of female-headed households in many
regions of the world partly reflects their
unwillingness to continue accepting
the injustice of the situation. It is this
phenomenon that has given rise to claims
about the ‘feminisation of poverty’
but there is no necessary association
between female headship and poverty.
A better indicator of female poverty—
and of continuing female disadvantage
in the labour market—relates to the
economic situation of female-maintained
households, those which rely solely
or primarily on female earnings. There
appears to be strong evidence from
studies of Africa, Asia and Latin
America that these households are
overrepresented in the ranks of the poor.
Female heads of these households work
longer hours and earn less on average
than households largely reliant on male
or joint incomes. At the same time, their
greater control over their incomes may
translate into higher levels of investment
in their children.
There are no easy generalisations about
the poverty implications of women’s
paid work. 
N. Kabeer: Marriage, motherhood
and masculinity in the global economy:
reconfigurations of personal and economic
life, IDS Working Paper No. 290, 2007. @
N. Kabeer: Mainstreaming gender equality
in poverty eradication and the Millenium
Development Goals, Commonwealth
Secretariat, IDRC and CIDA, 2003. @6 International Poverty Centre
Policy discussions about the
interactions between poverty and gender
inequality have tended in the last two
decades to use the idea of the feminisation
of poverty to explain differences between
male and female poverty in a given
context, as well as changes over time.
Typically, this approach has fed the
perception that female-headed households
—however defined¯tend to be poorer
than other households. Recent empirical
work has, however, cast doubt on this
generalisation and sent analysts of gender
and poverty back to the drawing board.
It is clear now that, not only is the
empirical generalisation inaccurate,
but that a single-minded focus on
female-headed households narrows
which households we focus on and
how we understand what goes on
within them. Focusing on female-headed
households is of course much simpler,
since this avoids having to address the
messy complexities posed by gender
relations within households, or the
ways in which development policies and
programmes affect them. But it is clearly
inadequate to the task.
Viewing poverty as a gendered
experience allows us to broaden the
scope of analysis to include all poor
households¯however headed. It also
directs us to a wider range of issues
beyond simply asking whether women
or men are poorer in income terms. These
include the ways in which poverty is
made a gendered experience by norms
and values, divisions of assets, work and
responsibility, and relations of power
and control. Gendered experiences
include (i) the differential impacts of
poverty on girls versus boys, and women
versus men within the household;
(ii) the gendered ways in which poor
households and their members respond
to poverty; and (iii) the gendered impact
of the design and implementation of
anti-poverty policies and programmes.
Understanding how gender relations
work to define the experience of
programmes requires focusing on:
 Who gets or has access to resources;
 How roles and relationships of work,
responsibilities, cooperation, sharing
or conflict define both women’s and
men’s living and working conditions
within households;
 How structures and programs of the
state and other actors, e.g. the private
sector and civil society,  reinforce or
transform those roles and
relationships; and
 How normative frameworks affecting
differential entitlements and
responsibilities are challenged or
reinforced by policies and programmes.
The generalisation that girls and women
bear greater work burdens and
responsibility for the care of human
beings through unpaid work within
households is well grounded empirically
through numerous time-use and
qualitative studies. However, the
experience of care work varies
profoundly between poor versus non-
poor, rural versus urban, or landed versus
landless households. Evidence from the
National Sample Survey in India shows
that care work in the poorest rural
households is likely to include mainly
fuel and water gathering, while in
somewhat better-off households,
it includes the care of livestock and
kitchen gardens, or fodder collection.
In households that are even better off,
women are also more likely to engage
in activities such as embroidery and
supervision of household workers.
The care work done by women and girls
in the poorest households tends
by Gita Sen,
Indian Institute of Management Poverty as a Gendered
Experience:
The policy implications
The poverty experience is
gendered by the differential
impacts on women and men,
girls and boys, and by their
different responses.
This should be considered




For poor women, time is
often the most valuable
resource; it is so much
taken up by caring work
that they can remain caught
in a vicious circle of poverty.
Collecting more gender-
based data can improve
the functioning of social
policies and help
ensure the reduction
of gendered poverty.Poverty in Focus   January 2008    7
therefore to be extremely time- and
drudgery-intensive, but critical to
household members’ ability to sustain
basic daily consumption. As a result, it
drastically limits women’s choice of
compatible income earning opportunities,
their ability to take time off for
government programmes, social
exchanges or minimal leisure, and their
possibilities for acknowledging their own
needs for rest, recuperation or health care.
The gendered impact of poverty not only
distinguishes between women and men,
but also differentiates how care work
burdens and responsibilities are
experienced by different women.
Evidence suggests that, where such
burdens are reinforced by strong gender
norms that define the ‘good’ woman
as self-sacrificing, poor women in
particular are likely to receive much less
acknowledgement of—or attention to—
their needs for nutrition or health care,
not only by other family members but
even by themselves.
Poor households cope in a variety of
ways, some of which are gendered.
In doing so, they react not only to
insufficiency of incomes but also
to insecurity and risk. As household
income rises above poverty levels, risk
management often dictates behaviours
that appear more appropriate to lower
income levels, at least until the new
higher level becomes more secure.
Well known are such responses as
increased time spent on work, reduced
consumption levels, increases in debt,
debt-peonage, migration, and fostering
in or out of household members.
Less understood are such strategies
as maintenance of socio-economic
networks through ceremonies
requiring consumption, spreading risk
and borrowing potential by taking
on multiple jobs, desertion or
abandonment of the family, and selective
education or rationing of health care
among family members.
At least three of these responses are
gendered, although with variations
across cultural and economic contexts.
While men may take on more paid work,
partly to buy items such as tobacco and
liquor, women often face difficult time
allocation choices between paid and
unpaid work with home-made or freely
gathered consumption items like food,
clothing, and fuel. These tensions are
often resolved by sacrificing the leisure,
play-time, or education of daughters,
who are expected to take on additional
care work including kitchen tasks,
foraging, and looking after siblings,
as well as other responsibilities.
Another gendered response is desertion
or abandonment of families, a strategy
often used by poor men to escape the
responsibilities of contributing to
household consumption, particularly
when their partners or spouses become
pregnant. A third phenomenon noticed
particularly in South Asia is selective
education and health care with sharply
lower entitlements for women and
girls relative to men and boys. Such
differentials in entitlements are reinforced
through gendered norms and values
that permeate across the economic
spectrum.While they tend to be lower in
intensity for better-off households, they
do not completely disappear.
The gendered impacts of poverty
and of household responses to
impoverishment are often missed in
the design of anti-poverty policies and
programmes. Women’s responsibilities
for care fundamentally affect their
ability to participate in social
programmes, in labour markets,
and to derive benefits from household
resources. For poor women, time is often
the most valuable resource, and poor
women’s time is so much taken up by
caring work that they can remain caught
in a vicious circle of poverty. Even worse,
social policies often profit from this
gendered division of work and its
associated norms, thereby reinforcing
the gendered norms and roles that are
at the root of women’s poverty and
within-household inequalities.
Putting mothers ‘at the service of
the state’ represents a convenient
marriage of new social policies built
on downsizing and decentralising the
state while ensuring ‘community’
responsibilities—largely women’s—
for the success of programmes. Recent
examination of conditional cash transfer
programmes through a gender lens
reveals that they can make significant
additional demands on poor women’s
time if designed in this way. Although
women may be willing to pay this ‘time
tax’ in order to improve their children’s
health, nutrition or education, it is
nonetheless a costly burden and may
involve other hidden sacrifices and
burdens. The hidden gendered cost of
programmes also raises questions about
programme sustainability.
How can these insights be used for
programme assessment? The collection
of more gender-based information can
be a way to improve programme
functioning, e.g., the Observatorio de
Genero y Pobreza as a complement to the
Oportunidades  programme in Mexico.
Such information can be used to
understand better the way in which
the care economy and gendered poverty
are affected by and affect social policies.
Programme development based on such
information can help to ensure that
gendered responsibilities for care are
not reinforced, as these are at the core
of gendered poverty.
Such approaches can be complemented
by programmes to transform masculinist
norms and behaviours in relation to care
work and responsibilities. Schools,
public education, child and adolescent
programme should focus gender
education not only on girls but also
on boys and young men. Consistent
attention has to be paid to violence
against women and girls within
households which is often triggered
by women’s not meeting male demands
in relation to food, keeping the house
clean, taking care of children, sexuality
or reproduction. Such changes in
anti-poverty programmes may require
as a pre- or at least a co-requisite,
the transformation of mindsets within
government bureaucracies towards
greater awareness of the gendered
consequences of policies
and programmes.  
M. Molyneux: Mothers at the Service
of the New Poverty Agenda: Progresa/
Oportunidades, Mexico’s conditional
transfer programme, Social Policy and
Administration, 40 (4): pp 425–49, 2006.  @
G. Sen & C. Sen: Women’s Domestic Work
and Economic Activity: Results from National
Sample Survey, Economic and Political
Weekly, April 27, 1985, ppWS49-55.8 International Poverty Centre
Women face barriers to enter
the labour market; if they
find a job, their earnings
are lower than those of men.
Reducing gender inequalities
implies benefits not only for
women but also for men,
children and the elderly,
for both poor and rich.
Simulations show that
removing entry barriers
would have a much stronger
impact on growth, poverty
and inequality than ending
wage discrimination.
Paid work for women
effectively reduces
poverty and inequality.
Gender inequalities are present in
many ways in the labour market. Two
relevant indicators of these inequalities
are the ratio between female and male
participation in the paid workforce and
the ratio between female and male
hourly wages. These indicators reflect
the fact that women face barriers to
enter the labour market and, when they
find a job, their earnings are lower than
those of men.
The gender gap indicators among urban
adults in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El
Salvador and Mexico are shown in the
chart below. In each of these countries,
the rate of economic activity among
females is below 62 per cent while the
male rate is higher than 84 per cent.
The ratio between female and male
labour market participation is not more
than 0.6 in Chile and Mexico. The female
hourly wage is around 80 per cent of
that of males for all countries, except
Argentina with a ratio of 92 per cent.
The disadvantages faced by women in the
labour market have negative economic
consequences for the society as a whole.
The elimination of the various barriers they
face would result in an increase in their
earnings and consequently an increase
in the income of the households. It might
also result in the economic empowerment
of women, economic growth and the
reduction of poverty and inequality.
Therefore, reducing gender inequalities
implies benefits not only for women but
also for men, children and the elderly, and
for the poor as well as the rich.
It is difficult to know exactly what
would be the impact on society of
a reduction of gender inequalities.
However, some techniques allow
estimates of what society would gain
with less gender inequality. Simulating
what would happen to poverty, social
inequality and the total level of income
in society gives an idea of the direction
and magnitude of what would happen
if the gender gaps in participation and
wages were eliminated.
In order to draw scenarios without
gender bias in the labour market of
these five Latin American countries, we
constructed counterfactuals based on
two separate static simulations. The first
one calculates what might happen if we
suppose women enter the labour market
to the same extent as men. In other
words, the assumption is that the barriers
to women’s entrance in the labour
market are the same as those for men,
while ignoring any changes in the
gender wage gap.
In the second simulation we keep
participation rates constant and
eliminate the gender wage
discrimination. In other words, we
eliminate the gender discrimination by
assuming that women with the same
     by Joana Costa and Elydia Silva,
International Poverty Centre The Burden of Gender
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characteristics as men receive the same
wages and salaries.
Each of these simulations generates a
new level and distribution of income in
society. This allows us to estimate their
impact in terms of economic growth,
poverty and inequality. The results
presented here must be considered
with the caveat that these simulation
exercises are essentially partial
equilibrium effects. Nonetheless,
they provide important empirical
evidence that gender inequalities
act as barriers to pro-poor growth.
The simulated gender gap indicators
are very different from the real ones,
as shown in the lower part of the chart
on the previous page. Applying the male
participation structure to women results
in an increase of female labour
participation rate in all five countries.
Only in Mexico was the increase not
enough to approximate the  female
economic activity rate to the male one.
Moreover, without wage discrimination,
the earnings of women would increase
substantially in all five countries.
Actually, in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
they would even be higher than those
of men because, on average, working
women in these countries are better
qualified than men. In a few words, it
means that it is not the characteristics
of women but gender discrimination
that put females in a worse position
in the labour market.
To avoid difficulties related to the choice
of a specific poverty line we made our
simulations for different lines and
measures of poverty; the substantive
conclusions always converged. The results
shown in the chart above are based on
the impacts on poverty incidence for the
initial poverty lines defining the 20 per
cent poorest households in each country.
Eliminating barriers to participation
would have a much stronger effect
on poverty than ending wage
discrimination. If women faced no
barriers to enter the labour market, the
incidence of poverty would be reduced
by at least 25 per cent in Argentina and
Brazil and by as much as 41 per cent in
Chile. On the other hand, if only wage
discrimination was eliminated, the fall in
poverty incidence would vary from 1.1
per cent in Chile to 10 per cent in Brazil.
While the simulation of no wage
discrimination shows little impact on
inequality, the participation simulation
has a strong effect. There would be a
reduction by around five per cent in the
Gini inequality measure of the family
per capita income for the five countries
if women increased their labour market
participation to the level of men.
Reducing gender inequality would also
promote economic growth. The growth
of the mean income level would vary
from 6 per cent in Brazil to 11 per cent
in Chile and El Salvador if there were
no differentiated gender barriers to
enter the labour market; and from
2 per cent in El Salvador to 8 per cent
in Brazil without any gender
discrimination in wages.
Most important of all, this growth
would be very pro-poor since it has an
important impact on poverty.
In the outstanding case of Chile, in
the simulation of no barriers to
participation, the relation between
growth and poverty would be around
one to four, that is, for each percentage
point of growth due to improved
gender equity there would be a
decrease of four percentage points
in the incidence of poverty.
Although these figures are not exact
and must be used with caution, their
overall direction and magnitude can
hardly be disputed. At least two
important conclusions arise from
these simulations.
First, gender inequalities in the labour
market represent a burden to the
entire society, not only to women.
A reduction of gender gaps in wage
and participation can result in higher
economic growth as well as reduced
poverty and inequality.
Second, the reduction of the discrepancy
between the female and male economic
activity levels has more impact in these
three areas than the reduction of the
gender wage gap.
Gender discrimination among paid
workers is important but it seems that
increasing the female participation in
the labour market would be a priority
in order to have faster and stronger
effects in the reduction of poverty
and inequality. 
J. Costa, E. Silva and M. Medeiros:
The Growth Equivalent of Reducing
Gender Inequalities in Latin America.
IPC Working Paper, forthcoming.10 International Poverty Centre
Gender equality represents an
untapped source when it comes to
stimulating economic growth and
promoting social development. This is
particularly true in the developing world,
where women are often systematically
deprived from having equal access to
social services as well as to physical
and social capital. In fact, increased
gender equality promises significant
returns. Apart from being an important
goal in itself, empowering women by
improving their living conditions and
enabling them to actively participate in
the social and economic life of a country
may well be the key for long-term
sustainable development.
According to the World Bank’s World
Development Report 2000/01, closing
the gender gap in schooling would have
significantly increased and sometimes
more than doubled economic growth in
sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the
Middle East and North Africa. Despite
international declarations on gender
equality, as examplified by the
Millenium Development Goals, only
few countries have actually achieved
gender equality in primary and
secondary education. The differences
are even more pronounced in higher
education. In South Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, girls only
make up half of the number of students
in tertiary education.
Equally alarming are labour market
indicators, which clearly highlight that
countries do not adequately use their
available human resources, in particular
those of the female population. In many
developing countries, women’s
economic activities are marginalised to
the informal sector, small-scale farming
and/or domestic work. Cases in point are
South Asia and the Middle East and
North Africa: in both regions only
around 20 per cent of all wage
employment outside agriculture is
held by women.
As illustrated by these figures, women
face serious inequalities in many
regions of the world. Although
discrimination against women has
multiple facets, most research in this
area exclusively focuses on examining
a) the economic status of women;
b) women’s access to resources such as
education and health; and/or
c) the political participation
and empowerment of women.
Less attention, however, is given to
social institutions that impact on gender
equality such as informal family laws,
cultural traditions and social norms.
In order to address this important
information gap, the OECD
Development Centre introduced the
Gender, Institutions and Development
Data Base (GID-DB) in March 2006.
The data base suggests a framework
that groups twelve individual social
institutions indicators into four
main categories:
i) Family Code, including information
on marriage customs (age of marriage,
inheritance practices, and existence of
polygamy) and decision-making power
within a household (parental authority,
repudiation);
ii) Physical Integrity, capturing violence
against women through traditional
practices such as female genital
mutilation or other attacks (e.g. rape,
assault, harassment);
iii) Civil Liberties, measuring the extent
to which women can participate in social
life (e.g. moving freely in public without
the obligation to wear a veil or be
escorted by male relatives); and
by Denis Drechsler,
Johannes Jütting and Carina Lindberg,
OECD Development Centre Gender, Institutions
and Development:
Better data, better policies
Enabling women to actively
participate in social and
economic life may well be
the key for long-term
sustainable development.
Gender inequalities are still
huge in most developing
countries  both in education
and in labour markets.
They are generated by
social institutions such as
informal family laws, cultural
traditions and social norms.
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iv) Ownership Rights, indicating the
quality of women’s most basic economic
right—to hold property, whether in the
form of bank loans, land, or other
material assets.
The GID-DB covers a total of 161
countries and has been compiled
from various sources. It combines in
a systematic and coherent fashion the
current empirical evidence that exists
on the socio-economic status of women.
The social institutions variables have all
been coded (on a scale from 0 to 1, where
1 indicates full discrimination) in order to
allow for cross-country comparisons.
The impact of restrictive social norms
on women’s social and economic
development is easy to imagine:
even if economic opportunities might
exist, restrictive social norms will
prevent women from taking advantage
of them. Women neither lack interest
in paid work nor are they short
of entrepreneurial ideas, but when
society and family members discourage
women to engage in economic
activities, it is not easy to pursue a
professional career.
In sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of
women work in the agricultural sector,
but patriarchal traditions often deny
them the right to own and manage the
land they cultivate. Some countries
in the Middle East and North Africa
require women to have male company
when leaving the house, making it
difficult for them to attend educational
facilities and engage in business
activities independently. The region’s
banks and lending institutions also
often ask female clients to obtain their
husband’s permission or co-signature
before granting them a credit. In some
instances, social norms such as female
genital mutilation or any other type of
violence against women—within or
outside of the household—not only
violate women’s basic human rights,
but they seriously impair their health
status and future chances in a
professional career.
Preliminary analyses using the GID-DB
clearly indicate the relevance of social
institutions for understanding the
economic role of women. There are
strong indications that high inequality
in social institutions is associated with
lower rates of female participation in
the labour market. What is more, the
common assertion that economic
growth alone will eventually accomplish
gender equality seems too simplistic:
growth is often a necessary, but far from
sufficient condition for improving the
status of women. This is a robust result
of an in-depth econometric analysis
regressing female labour force
participation on growth, social
institutions and a set of control
variables such as access to education
and health.
Information on restrictive social
institutions and their impact on
women’s social and economic
development is vital to understand
gender equality. Better data are
urgently needed to design meaningful
policies that can address the root
causes of gender equality. A school
built exclusively for girls might seem
to be an important step towards
achieving gender equality. But if social
norms prevent girls from attenting this
facility, the school does little to improve
the status of girls and women.
Social norms that impact on gender
equality are hard to observe and even
more difficult to measure and quantify.
The GID-DB is a first attempt to introduce
social institutions into the debate, but it
cannot provide a comprehensive account
of all traditions and cultural practices
that affect the role of women.
In view of these challenges, the OECD
Development Centre is currently
constructing an Internet platform
that will allow people to report their
experiences and share their perceptions
of social norms that impede gender
equality. This initiative, Wiki-Gender, will
provide an open resource for people
interested in finding out more about
gender equality around the world.
It will allow users to modify and
improve data provided therein, inviting
them to challenge existing information
and to provide new entries that will
increase the common knowledge base.
Only then will we have a better
understanding of the manifold ways
in which social institutions affect
women’s development and can
construct policies that effectively
address the current situation.
J. Jütting, C. Morrisson, J. Dayton-Johnson,
and D. Drechsler: Measuring Gender
(In)Equality: The OECD Gender, Institutions
and Development Data Base;
Journal of Human Development,
forthcoming, March 2008. @
Note: The explanatory variable uses the arithmetic average of all sub-sectors of social institutions;
a value of 1 (0) indicates the highest (lowest) level of inequality in social institutions.12 International Poverty Centre
Fundamental and far-reaching
changes have taken place in the world
economy over the past several decades
that have had a profound impact on the
lives of women and men.
Two key aspects of the transformation
are (i) the heightened and growing
degree of global economic, social and
cultural integration—i.e. the process of
‘globalisation’—and (ii) a shift in policy
stance towards deregulated markets,
privatisation, a smaller role for the state
and a relatively narrow focus on
reducing inflation.
These changes impact employment and
poverty outcomes for women and men.
Gender dynamics are central to this
discussion. Whether households stay
out of poverty in this changing global
environment may hinge on whether
women participate in the labour force and
have access to decent paid employment.
Women’s measured labour force
participation has been increasing in many
regions around the world, a process
sometimes described as ‘the feminisation
of labour’. However, these global changes
have a fundamental impact on the
allocation of labour time and economic
resources in the household. Moreover,
employment opportunities are unequally
distributed, with women concentrated in
lower quality, more precarious forms of
paid work. Taken together, all these factors
have enormous implications for the
vulnerability of households, the risk of
poverty and achieving sustainable human
development. Therefore, the analysis must
incorporate a gender perspective when
interpreting how global policy changes
impact employment and poverty.
Gender relations determine the ways in
which market and non-market work is
organised. Women often have primary
by James Heintz,
Political Economy Research Institute,
University of Massachusetts Amherst Poverty, Employment
and Globalisation:
A gender perspective
responsibility for unpaid, non-market
housework and caring labour. This
constrains their choices in terms of
labour force participation and their
access to paid employment, both formal
and informal. The allocation of time to
non-market as opposed to market work
limits the household income that women
control directly. Furthermore, with more
time allocated to non-market work,
women frequently have less paid work
experience or have to interrupt their
employment, factors which often
translate into lower earnings.
Gender segmentation is endemic in
labour markets around the world, with
women often concentrated in low-paid,
unstable and poor-quality employment.
Wage labour markets might not be the
only, and often not the most important,
market exchange relating to these forms
of employment. For instance, quasi
labour markets exist in which workers
sell a product or service, but within a
set of dependent relationships that limit
their authority over the employment
arrangement. Examples include
sub-contracted production, or home work,
in which workers produce or assemble
goods for a set of specification given
by the work provider within a longer
supply chain.
Often social benefits and protection are
absent for these types of precarious and
informal employment, raising the
economic risk that women working in
these activities face, as they are undertaken
outside the ambit of labour legislation.
This type of labour force segmentation
reduces women’s earning potential. With
lower expected earnings, investment in
female education is frequently neglected.
Similarly, perceived lower earning
potential of women reinforces the gender
Globalisation and neo-liberal
policies impact the gender
dynamics of employment
and poverty outcomes.
With ‘feminisation of labour’
women are concentrated




Access to paid employment
does not always translate into
control over a portion of the
household’s income.
It is critical to incorporate
the gender dimension into
the growth-employment-
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division of labour within the household,
since the opportunity cost, in terms of
foregone income, of specialising in
unpaid care work is lower for women
than for men.
Women who specialise in providing
unpaid care work face enormous
economic risks. Such specialisation not
only lowers their earnings potential and
reinforces dependencies on a male
‘breadwinner’. Often women do not have
the same access to social protections,
such as pensions for old age, thereby
increasing their risk of falling into poverty.
The gender division between market
and non-market work, the unequal
distribution of employment opportunities,
and women’s lower earnings potential
reinforce established gender dynamics
at household level. For example, women’s
influence over the distribution of
resources and labour within the household
is weakened when opportunities to earn
income through employment are limited.
Increasing women’s access to paid
employment has the potential to change
gender roles and household dynamics,
depending on the resilience of gender
norms in society and the type of
employment to which women have access.
The relationship between paid market
work and prevailing gender relations
is complex. Access to remunerative
employment does not always translate
into control over a portion of the
household’s income. Similarly, labour
market participation may involve costs
as well as benefits. These factors influence
the extent to which women’s access to
employment alters gender dynamics.
Labour supply decisions are often
determined at both household and
individual levels. Women’s labour force
participation has been shown to increase
with economic crises and policies that
trigger labour displacement, job
instability and higher rates of
unemployment. Women also increase
their labour force participation in
response to sustained structural
unemployment. For instance, research
into the determinants of women’s labour
supply in post-apartheid South Africa
has shown that women’s labour force
participation responded to increases in
household joblessness, thereby placing
further upward pressure on the country’s
average unemployment rate.
Structural changes that threaten
household living standards also
demonstrate the impact of established
gender norms on men. Not all men
occupy identical positions within
the global economy. Many men are
employed in precarious activities with
low earnings. In addition, racial and
ethnic identity frequently circumscribes
the economic opportunities available to
both men and women.
Growing earnings inequality, an erosion
of the quality of paid work, or greater
joblessness disproportionately affects
those in more unstable forms of
employment. The entire household—
men, women and children—becomes
susceptible to poverty. Such pressures
affect men who have been socialised to
think of themselves as ‘breadwinners’. In
particular, established gender roles may
cause men to see the deterioration in
employment as a personal failing,
instead of a systemic economic problem.
The coping strategies adopted at the
household level in response to negative
economic shocks underscore the
importance of taking these dynamics into
account when considering the linkages
between growth, employment and
poverty. For countries with well-developed
social welfare systems, government policies
mitigate these negative consequences.
However, for countries without publicly
supported systems of social protection,
households and communities become a
safety net of last resort.
An additional link exists between paid
employment, non-market work and
human development. The ability to
translate access to paid employment into
new capabilities, greater freedom and
improved investments in children
depends on the nature of relationships
within the household and the process by
which decisions are made concerning the
allocation of labour time and economic
resources. Indeed, increased gender
inequalities, even in the short-run,
can have long-term consequences
for economic growth and human
development. Therefore, it is critical to
incorporate the gender dimension into
the growth-employment-poverty nexus.
Otherwise, the picture will not be fully
understood and the implementation of
an effective development strategy
will be compromised.
The two ‘feminisations’—of labour and
of poverty—do not provide an adequate
framework for understanding the
connections between employment and
poverty risk. For example, the ‘feminisation
of labour’ may be a response to, instead
of a cause of, increases in precarious
employment around the world. Similarly,
the gendered dynamics of poverty are
complex and also have implications for
the well-being of children and men.
Therefore, poverty risk cannot be
reduced to simple indicators, such as
female headship. Instead, we need a
framework for linking employment and
poverty, which takes into account
gendered interactions at three levels:
(1) the household level; (2) at the level
of intra-household dynamics; and (3) the
individual level. Only by analysing the
employment-poverty nexus at each of
these three levels, will an adequate
analysis be produced.
Despite this call for a more complex
analysis of the connections between
gender relations, employment and
poverty, one fact remains clear:
women’s paid employment is an
essential factor determining the risk
of poverty that families face.
Women’s employment contributes
to total household income; women’s
participation in the labour market
can affect intra-household bargaining
outcomes, conditional on decision-
making processes and who controls the
income; and access to employment has
important implications for individual
freedoms, capabilities and dignity.
Exactly how women’s employment
affects social and economic wellbeing will
depend on the institutional context and
the specific prevailing gender relations.
J. Heintz: Globalization, Economic Policy
and Employment: Poverty and gender
implications. ILO Employment Strategy
Papers, Geneva 2006:3. @14 International Poverty Centre
Analysis indicates that investments
in gender equality can accelerate
economic growth and poverty reduction.
However, despite increasing interest in
the growth effects of inequality and a
resurgence of concern over gender
discrimination, there is little to suggest
that gender differentiation is consistently
or effectively addressed in growth policy
formulation or implementation.
The evidence suggests that gender
inequality and women’s limited capacity
to respond to economic opportunity
inhibits growth via three main channels:
 Education affects women’s capacity
to make effective choices about
employment, family planning
and investments in children.
 Labour market participation impacts
productivity, income and savings.
 Institutions govern women’s asset
use, time burden, and intra and
extra household bargaining positions.
There are serious limitations in current
analysis resulting partly from lack of
data and partly from the difficulties in
examination of complex information.
Creating better data and improving
analysis are obviously priorities for
well informed growth policy. In addition
though, and even prior to better
informed policy development, there
is sufficient proof currently available
to begin the process of addressing the
detrimental growth and poverty effects
of gender inequality.
Gender discrimination in labour, land,
credit and technology markets is a
common phenomenon. There is a wealth
of evidence showing that: women have
less choice about and lower returns to
engagement in labour markets; fewer
women ‘own’ land or access other
productive assets; women’s choices are
constrained by an opportunity structure
that limits their choice in relation to
the State, markets and society. This
combination of factors perpetuates
women’s reduced capacity to move out
of poverty and contribute to growth.
It points to key policy and programme
options for women’s economic
empowerment, viz.: addressing the
gender gap in human capital; reducing
women’s time burdens; providing
opportunities and incentives for women’s
equal employment outside of the
household and promoting gender
responsive budgeting.
Women’s education levels correlate with
wages and per capita income. Higher
earnings potentially also increase
household savings and investment for
growth. Women’s level of education,
bargaining power within households,
economic status and control over
household resources are all strong
determinants of fertility and the human
capital outcomes of their children—all of
which have a positive effect on growth.
The link between investment in human
capital and growth is not news, but what
the evidence indicates is that more
attention to reducing gender inequality in
education, and across different types of
education—including health education—
will result in significant growth effects.
For a variety of reasons education
remains high on the agenda of many
governments, so education will continue
to be a key factor in equalising
relationships between men and women
and in giving women access to income
earning opportunities. As educating
females makes good economic sense,
growth policy can continue to support
efforts towards equal educational
opportunities, particularly in terms of
post-primary education for girls where the












common in labour, land,
credit and technology
markets; it needs to be
specifically addressed.
Reducing the time burden
of women enables them to
engage in paid employment,
improve the productivity of
farm labour or increase
entrepreneurial activity.
Gender budgeting mehods
can be applied to better target
government expenditures to
maximise their impact on
gender inequality.Poverty in Focus   January 2008    15
It is widely  believed that reducing the
time burden of non-paid or domestic
labour is critical for women’s economic
empowerment. Policies designed to
promote growth have failed to elicit the
expected market response from women
in part because women are time-poor
and locked into activities for which there
is little or no substitute labour.
Commonly classified as tasks belonging
to the reproductive sector, these activities
essentially involve reproduction and
maintenance of the future and current
labour force and include activities such
as fetching water, cooking, collecting
firewood, childcare. Across the world
women take greater responsibility
than men for maintaining domestic
environments, child care and non-cash
economy activities.
Reducing the time burden of women
enables them to engage in paid
employment, improve the productivity of
farm labour or increase entrepreneurial
activity. Key interventions that would—
in addition to reducing drudgery—free
women to make the choices about
engaging in activities with a more direct
contribution to growth include:
 targeted infrastructure such as roads,
wells, energy that improve access,
reduce time burdens and/or increase
ease of use of domestic services
 reducing the cost of existing
infrastructure and domestic services
to increase usage, and childcare
schemes, which are often essential
for labour market participation by
reducing time burdens.
Patterns of gender equality generally
improve as economies grow, diversify
and mature. The transition to market
economies creates employment
opportunities for women across sectors.
At higher overall income levels,
manufacturing and service sectors
tend to support more gender equality,
as do higher levels of urbanisation and
education. More open and competitive
economies are less tolerant of certain
sorts of discriminatory practices, which in
economic terms represent an inefficient
use of human resources.
Many countries have ratified international
conventions supporting women’s equal
participation in the labour force. Yet, a
number of these countries have not
established policies and practices which
reflect these conventions and provide
little in terms of the welfare provision
that would aid women’s entry and
participation in the labour market. While
wage and labour inequalities remain in
even the most sophisticated economies,
employment discrimination is more
marked in poorer countries, suggesting
that this is an area of promising action
to address the effects of gender
inequality on growth.
Women and men enter the labour force as
either employees or as entrepreneurs. Key
areas for policy and practice—addressing
both forms of engagement—include
formalising the informal sector, ensuring
equal pay and benefits, giving equal
access to business assets, and providing
natal and maternity welfare support.
Equality in the terms of employment of
women and rules governing women’s
capacity to develop as entrepreneurs
is of particular importance for poverty
reduction in countries in which
economic growth is taking off through
a transition to a market based economy.
The barriers women face when
establishing and managing businesses
are common and limit growth. Women-
run businesses are frequently unable
to respond to emerging economic
opportunities, as regulations relating to
the right of women to own assets and
operate businesses in their own name
prevent them from doing so. Informal
barriers and costs, such as much greater
exposure than men to official harassment,
enforcement of ‘nuisance taxes’ and social
rules governing women’s behaviour and
bargaining position, limit the free and
equal operation of asset and product
markets for women.
Action can also be taken to better target
government expenditures to maximise
their impact on gender inequality.
Gender budgeting integrates gender
analysis into economic policy, offering
the opportunity to reduce gender
inequality and improve expenditures
that target growth promoting initiatives.
Common to both better analysis and
each of these action areas is the simple—
but surprisingly poorly addressed—
issue of the determinants of gender
inequality. Gender inequality is rooted
in beliefs and norms of male/female
behaviour and all evidence points to the
fact that formal institutions—legal and
regulatory—as well as informal ones—
social and cultural—are weighted against
women’s equal participation in private
and public life, including markets.
Formal institutions comprise legislation
and regulations. Informal institutions
comprise customary law and social
norms. Both govern gender relations and
behaviour, as well as women’s ownership
of and access to productive assets.
Getting the formal legal and regulatory
structure right is critical, but enforcement
by the state is often undermined by
customary law and norms. Many
countries have passed or are in the
process of putting in place legislation
and policies that seek to equalise gender
relations. However, it is common practice
for traditional social institutions to
override these formal, state imposed
institutions in the household, in the
market and in relation to the state.
Changing culture, particularly the power
relationships and behaviour that culture
defines, is a sensitive issue for donors
and most governments. However, change
in some social institutions may be pre-
requisite to gender equality.
States seeking to enhance women’s
contributions to growth have proved that
they can take action towards this end by
providing a formal enabling environment.
When well monitored—and government
functionaries and citizen provided with
incentives—such efforts have provided a
framework for social change.
The growth effects of gender inequality
indicate that governments can no longer
afford to dismiss social institutions as
beyond their remit or too difficult to
manage in practice or for analysts
to ignore as explanatory variables.
Gender Equality and Growth. Evidence
and Action, DFID, UK, 2007;
R. Alsop, M. Bertelsen and J. Holland:
Empowerment in Practice: From Analysis to
Implementation. The World Bank, 2006. @16 International Poverty Centre
The relationship between the
incidence of poverty and the level
of gender equality as measured by
various alternative indices suggests that
developing countries with higher gender
equality tend to have lower poverty
rates. The chart presents a scatter plot
of poverty headcount ratio (for the $2 per
day poverty line) and gender equality, as
measured by the female-to-male ratio of
sex-specific Human Development Indices
for a set of 73 countries circa 1997. The
inverse relationship between gender
equality and poverty shown in this
scatter plot is quite robust to other
measures of poverty and other measures
of gender equality.
Bivariate correlations, of course, cannot
establish causality. One could easily
argue, for example, that increases in
wealth drive increases in gender
equality—rather than the other way
round—since discrimination may become
increasingly costly to firms in developed
economies with tighter labour markets.
In fact, cross country correlations and
even more rigorous regression analysis
are unlikely ever to allow us to establish
definitive relationships between gender
equality and poverty; the simultaneities
are too great and we do not have
suitable econometric instruments to
solve this problem.
It is considerably easier to examine
the links between gender equality and
poverty at the household level. It is often
thought that female-headed households
are more likely to be poor than male-
headed households. Empirical evidence
on this score, however, is mixed.
One review of 61 studies on headship
and poverty found female-headed
households to be disproportionately
represented among the poor in only
38 cases; another finds that the
relationship between female headship
Developing countries with
lower gender inequality tend
to have lower poverty rates.
Less gender inequality in
resources such as education
and access to employment
can reduce the likelihood of
a household being poor.
Female labour force
participation, in particular,
plays a key role in cushioning
households from the impact
of macroeconomic shocks
and keeping them out
of poverty.
Other major factors are
gender inequality in access to
land titles and, as a result,
to credits. Microfinance can
reduce gender inequality
and poverty.
and poverty is strong in only two out
of ten countries examined.
One reason for these mixed results is that
it is not easy to define headship. Studies
apply a variety of techniques including
definitions of headship used by national
surveys, self-reported headship status by
survey respondents, and definitions based
on contributions to household income.
There is also substantial heterogeneity
among female-headed households.
Depending on the country and region, the
population of female-headed households
may be primarily composed of elderly
widows, divorced women, single women
with children, or women whose husbands
are migrants.  Some of these groups, such
as the elderly and widows, are more
vulnerable to falling into poverty than
others, such as women who receive
remittances from migrant husbands.
Why might female-headed households be
more likely to be poor than male-headed
households? A study from Brazil examines
three possible explanations: (1) fewer
adults have positive income, (2) the labour
income of principal earners is low, and
(3) the dependency ratio is high. The study
comes to the conclusion that the low
labour income of the principal earners
is the primary reason why female-headed
households in Brazil are  poorer.
Simulations show that if the earners
in female-headed households had the
average incomes of earners in male-
headed households, their average per
capita expenditure would be higher than
that of male-headed households. This is
primarily because female-heads are more
likely to participate in the labour market
relative to male-heads.
Are female-headed households more
likely to be chronically poor than male-
by Andrew Morrison,
Dhushyanth Raju and Nistha Sinha,
The World Bank Gender Equality
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headed households? That depends on the
differences in their respective abilities
to adopt and manage risk. Empirical
analysis of poverty dynamics shows
that household heads’ education,
household demographics and average
wealth are important determinants of
chronic poverty. To the extent that
female household heads tend to have
less education and their households
contain a higher proportion of
dependents, their households are more
likely to be chronically poor than male
headed households.
Ample evidence suggests that greater
gender equality in resources such as
education and access to employment can
reduce the likelihood of a household
being poor. Female labour force
participation, in particular, has been
shown to play a key role in cushioning
households from the impact of
macroeconomic shocks and keeping
households from falling into poverty.
At the same time, barriers to female
labour force participation remain
significant in some countries. Barriers
frequently identified include: the time
burden associated with child-rearing
and other domestic tasks, low
educational levels vis-a-vis men in
some regions of the developing world
that make women less competitive for
quality jobs, the role of existing wage
male-female wage gaps in generating
an ‘underinvestment’ in female
education and lower female labour
force participation rates than would be
the case in the absence of such wage
gaps, and laws and customs  that inhibit
women’s participation in labour markets.
Constraints to women’s participation in
other markets also matters for poverty
reduction. The existing research on
credit markets in developing countries—
admittedly scarce—suggests that by
and large women receive unfavorable
treatment not because of discriminatory
treatment per se, but rather because
of gender differences in individual
characteristics that are relevant for
loan qualification, e.g. holding land titles.
One institution that has had a major
impact on relaxing credit constraints for
the poor in general and for poor women
in particular has been microcredit.
Microcredit programmes, by providing
small loans mainly for non-agricultural
microenterprise activities, have had a
significant positive effect on household
incomes and assets, child schooling,
child and maternal health, and the
empowerment of female borrowers.
Consequently, microcredit programmes
are found widely around the developing
world and are considered to be an
important, cost-effective instrument
for helping the poor transform their
economic circumstances by enabling
them to pursue more lucrative
livelihood opportunities.
With regard to land markets, data on
landholdings disaggregated by sex are
woefully lacking in many regions of the
world. The scant existing evidence
appears to show that the distribution
of land ownership is heavily skewed
towards men. In Latin America, between
70 and 90 per cent of formal owners of
farmland are male and conditional on
land ownership, men on average own
more farmland than women.
Land ownership and tenure are crucial
for a number of reasons. Land ownership
is often the primary source of transferable
and inheritable wealth; it is also
frequently a requisite for participating
in formal credit markets in rural areas.
Careful studies show that tenure
insecurity impairs investment incentives
in general. Coupled with higher levels
of tenure insecurity for women in many
settings, this suggests that women’s
agricultural productivity relative to
men’s is likely to be lower due to higher
tenure insecurity.
Several studies in Sub-Saharan Africa
show that women have lower agricultural
productivity than men on same-sized
plots growing the same crops. Whatever
limited land rights women possess may
be precisely because men do not work
on women’s individual plots, and the
reallocation of labour and other inputs
from men’s plots to women’s plots may
threaten these rights.
There are a host of interesting policy
research issues related to gender equality
and poverty reduction. For some of these
issues, the accumulated body of research
is impressive; for others it is scant indeed.
Surprisingly, there are many areas of
crucial importance to policy—such as
gender issues in the functioning of credit
and land markets—where quite basic
questions remained to be answered.
These questions are of central
importance to the design of poverty
reduction policies and projects.
A. Morrison, D. Raju and N. Sinha: Gender
Equality, Poverty and Economic Growth.
Policy Research Working Paper 4349.
The World Bank 2007. Background paper
for the Global Monitoring Report 2007.  @18 International Poverty Centre
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University of Cambridge Reducing the Gender
Gap in Education:
The role of rural wage labour
Research results from rural
Mozambique show that
when women have greater
economic autonomy,




better results in educating
their children than do
other women.
Rural wage employment can
provide an escape route
from poverty for a new
generation of women
in Mozambique.
Yet, the share of both aid
and public expenditure
devoted to agriculture
and rural wage labour
in Africa has remained
remarkably small.
Analysis of research results from
rural Mozambique offers some important
new insights into gender relations and
the inter-generational transmission of
poverty. The Mozambican Rural Labour
Survey (MRLS) underpinned the research
and covered many of the poorest rural
households in the country. In some
of these households, especially in
households where women have greater
autonomy in making resource allocation
decisions, the welfare of young
daughters is less likely to be neglected
than in other households.
This finding confirms patterns found
in the international literature on the
determinants of gender gaps in education
and in nutrition between sons and
daughters. However, the estimates of
‘autonomy’ in this literature have not
considered divorced and separated status
as an unambiguous indicator of women’s
ability to act independently.
The MRLS contains a remarkably high
incidence of divorced, separated and
widowed women. Many women in the
survey told the researchers that they
became wage workers following the
death of or desertion by their spouse,
or said that they left the labour market
as soon as they married or began to
cohabit. These statements highlight the
need to examine interactions between
labour market participation and marital
status; and the major objective here is
to assess the implications of these
interactions for rural girls.
In much of the literature, the focus is
on maternal education as predicting
the level of child education, particularly
the education of girls, rather than
on the types of wage employment open
to women and their effects on girls’
schooling. In a paper commissioned
for a 2003 UNESCO report, Naila Kabeer
suggested that wage employment for
women “is generally associated with
lower levels of education of girls, most
often the oldest girl who substitutes for
her mother in the domestic division of
labour”. In contrast, the argument here
emphasises the positive impact of
women’s access to decent rural wage
employment opportunities, as the basis
for investment in their daughters’ future.
Many non-divorced/separated women
were found to be employed in ‘bad’ jobs,
often working for pitifully low wages
on nearby small farms as seasonal casual
laborers. Part of the explanation for this
finding may be the fact that men—
husbands or fathers—are forcibly
preventing them from travelling to
work in the better types of job offered
by larger-scale employers. Divorced and
separated women in the MRLS were more
likely than other women to succeed in
finding a decent job.
At the same time, divorced and separated
women clearly achieve better results in
educating their children than do other
women. Divorced and separated mothers
are especially good at investing in their
daughters’ education compared to non-
divorced/separated mothers and to male
wage workers. Thus, in absolute terms,
the daughters of divorced and separated
women have achieved more schooling—
in terms of the mean and median
number of years of schooling
completed—than the daughters of
non-divorced/separated women, as
shown in the table.
Moreover, the education gap between
daughters and sons of divorced and
separated mothers is lower than the
corresponding gap between the
daughters and sons of non-divorced/
separated mothers, i.e. divorced and
separated mothers favour their sons farPoverty in Focus   January 2008    19
Variable Stat
Children 16 yrs + Years of schooling Mean 4.62 4.25 4.36
Median 5.00 4.00 4.00
Sons 16 yrs + Years of schooling Mean 5.29 4.89 5.39
Median 5.00 5.00 5.00
Daughters 16 yrs + Years of schooling Mean 3.93 3.40 3.23
Median 4.00 3.00 3.00
Education of sons and daughters of female and male




mothers. The chart shows that the size of
the gender gap, measured by the ratio
of the mean or median years of
education achieved by sons compared
to daughters, is much higher for non-
divorced/separated than divorced
and separated mothers.
It is not surprising that the sons of the
male principal respondents in the MRLS
have had more years of education—a
mean of 5.39 years—than other children
in the MRLS, since their fathers are more
educated and earn higher wages, on
average, than female wageworkers.
It is, however, surprising that, as shown in
the Table, the children of divorced and
separated female principal respondents
are, on average, better educated than
the children of male principal
respondents—because the daughters
of divorced and separated women boost
the average by being significantly better
educated than the daughters of male
principal  respondents.
The median number of years of
education completed by the daughters
of divorced and separated women is
4 years, compared to 3 years for the
daughters of male principal respondents.
Although the sons of divorced and
separated women do complete 35 per
cent more years of education than
their daughters, 5.29 years compared to
3.93 years, the sons of male principal
respondents are much more privileged,
receiving 70 per cent more years of
education than the daughters of the
principal male respondents.
Thus, as shown in the chart, the size of
the gender gap between the education
of sons and daughters is particularly
large for the children of the male
principal respondents, very much larger
than the gender gap for the children
of divorced and separated women.
Some divorced and separated women
appear to have gained in self-confidence
not only through schooling, but also as a
result of the emancipatory experience of
a successful struggle to survive on their
wage income without a male partner.
As a result, they appreciate that their
daughters would be unwise to rely on
male support, especially if men continue
to restrict women’s access to the labour
market. Instead, they believe that their
daughters’ welfare and, less altruistically,
their ability to care for them in their old
age, will be greater if their daughters
remain at school for as long as possible.
Rural wage employment has the
potential to provide an escape route
from poverty for a new generation of
women in Mozambique. Therefore, it is
unfortunate that donors have done so
little to develop effective policies to
promote the massive investments in
agri-business and rural infrastructure
required to increase the demand for
female wage labour in rural Africa. The
most influential donor in Africa, the
World Bank, has only very recently
in the World Development Report 2008
recognized that “Making the rural labour
market a more effective pathway out of
poverty is …a major policy challenge
that remains poorly understood and
sorely neglected in policy making”.
In fact, the share of both aid and public
expenditure devoted to agricultural
investments in Africa has remained
remarkably small; and there has been
hardly any funding of research on rural
wage labour. Most donors, NGOs and
government agencies continue to
believe as an article of faith that the
poverty of rural women and their
daughters can be reduced significantly
by efforts to promote and subsidize
self-employment in micro-enterprises,
rather than wage employment. 
J. Sender and C. Oya: Divorced, Separated
and Widowed Female Workers in Rural
Mozambique. Feminist Economics,
forthcoming 2008. @
Note: DS = divorced or separated; NDS = non divorced/separated.
Marital Status












resources result in increased








from India shows significant
empowerment impact of a
major microfinance program
via women’s self-help groups.
Microfinance programmes have
been increasingly promoted for
their positive economic impact and the
belief that they empower women.
We investigate the impact of the Self
Help Bank Linkage Program in India
on women empowerment, defined as a
process in which women challenge the
existing norms and culture to effectively
improve their wellbeing within the
context of the society they live in.
Women in poor households are more
likely to be credit constrained, and hence
less able to undertake income-earning
activities. Microfinance programmes offer
access to credit to low-income households,
specifically targeting women, and thus
may meet poverty reduction and women’s
empowerment objectives.
Most microfinance programmes target
women with the explicit goal of
empowering them. However, their
underlying premises are different. Some
argue that women are amongst the
poorest and the most vulnerable of
the underprivileged. Others believe
that investing in women’s capabilities
empowers them to make choices, which is
valuable in itself, and also contributes to
greater economic growth and development.
Another motivation is the evidence from
research showing that an increase in
woman’s resources results in higher
wellbeing of the family, especially of the
children. Further, an increasing number
of microfinance institutions prefer
women members as they believe
that they are better and more reliable
borrowers thereby contributing to their
financial viability. Finally, a more
feminist point of view stresses that
access to financial resources presents an
opportunity for greater empowerment of
women. Though many agree that women
empowerment is an important
development objective for microfinance
programmes, it is still unclear what
women empowerment means.
Given the complexity of defining women
empowerment it is not surprising that
only a few empirical studies have tried to
examine the impact of microfinance on
women empowerment. For the most part,
empirical research on microfinance’s
effect on women’s empowerment has
been conceptually ungrounded and
tends to estimate an over-extended
definition of empowerment or a
truncated aspect of it. A number of these
studies also suffer from methodological
bias and flaws; only a few studies have
successfully investigated this impact in a
rigorous manner.
The interpretation of women
empowerment and its measurement varies
across different studies. Some studies
construct an index/indicator of women
empowerment. However, measuring
women empowerment by constructing
indices is an inappropriate technique as
it allows the use of arbitrary weights.
Most researchers, for instance, will agree
that impact of a women’s decision to buy
cooking oil for the family is different in
nature from her participation in a
decision to buy a piece of land. Both
these decisions have different
implications and magnitude of impact on
her empowerment. As such giving equal
weight to both these decisions does not
make sense. At the same time suggesting
an arbitrary weight for these decisions is
also inappropriate, as it is not for the
researchers to decide the factor by which
the latter decision contributes more to
women empowerment.
Other studies use Item Response Theory
(IRT), where the element of analysis is the
whole pattern of a set of binary indicatorsPoverty in Focus   January 2008    21
that proxy for woman’s autonomy,
decision-making power, and participation
in household and societal decision making.
They have found that credit programmes
lead to women taking a greater role
in household decision making, having
greater access to financial and economic
resources, having greater access to
financial and economic resources, having
greater social networks, more bargaining
power vis-à-vis their husbands and
having greater freedom of mobility.
Additional services like training,
awareness raising workshops and other
activities over and above the minimalist
microfinance approach—with provision
of financial services only—are also an
important determinant of the degree of
its impact on the empowerment process
of women.
A study of women in rural Kenya found
that in direct bank-borrower minimal
credit, women do not gain much in terms
of decision-making power within
the household.
However, when loans are channelled
through women’s groups and are
combined with more investment
in social intermediation, substantial
shifts in decision-making patterns are
observed. This involves a remarkable
shift in norm-following and male
decision-making towards more
bargaining and sole female decision-
making within the household.
The effects are even more striking when
women have been members of a group
for a longer period and especially when
greater emphasis has been laid on
genuine social intermediation. Social
group intermediation further gradually
transformed groups into actors of local
institutional change.
Another issue that needs further
investigation is whether, without change
in the macro environment, microcredits
reinforce women’s traditional roles or
promote gender equality.
A woman’s practical needs are closely
linked to the socially defined gender
roles, responsibilities, and social
structures, which contribute to a tension
between meeting women’s practical
needs in the short-term and promoting
long-term strategic change. By helping
women meet their practical needs
and increase their efficiency in their
traditional roles, microfinance may in fact
help women to gain respect and achieve
more in their socially defined roles, which
in turn may lead to increased esteem and
self-confidence.
Although increased self-confidence does
not automatically lead to empowerment,
it may contribute decisively to a woman’s
ability and willingness to challenge the
social injustices and discriminatory
systems that they face. This implies that
as women become financially better-off,
their self-confidence and bargaining
power within the household increases
and this indirectly leads to their
empowerment. Finally, given that
empowerment is a process, the impact
of the microfinance programme may take
a long time before it is significantly
reflected on the observable measures
of women empowerment.
Given the measurement problems, we used
a technique to estimate empowerment as a
latent rather than an observed variable.
The general structural model estimates
the mean women empowerment for 2000
and 2003, to measure the impact of the
Self Help Group (SHG) programme on
women empowerment.
The empirical analysis is based on data
collected in 2003 from five different
states of India. About 1000 households
were surveyed and their responses were
recorded by recall for the years 2003
and 2000. To investigate the impact of
microfinance participation on women
empowerment the data was analysed
over two sub-samples namely: SHGs
members group and a control group
comprised of non-SHG members.
The results are especially robust
indicating that on average there is a
significant increase in the women
empowerment of the SHG members
group. No significant change is observed
on average for the members of the
control group. The elegance of the result
lies in the fact that even though the
degree of change and the pace of
empowering women is likely to vary,
nevertheless the results clearly show that
the group of SHG members experience
a significant and higher empowerment.
While our results clearly indicate the
evidence for a general increase in women
empowerment for SHG members over
time, this does not imply that each and
every woman who joined the SHG
programme was empowered to the
same degree or they all progressed at the
same pace. Some of the women members
might have been more empowered
than other members within the SHG
programme, prior to their participation
in this programme. But on the average
the SHG members were empowered
over this time period. However, a similar
empowerment process cannot be
observed for the control group.
It is difficult to say which factors are
more important for empowering women.
The differences in pace of empowerment
might be a result of various factors:
household and village characteristics,
cultural and religious norms within the
society, behavioural  differences between
the respondents and their family members,
and the kind of training and awareness
programmes that the women have been
exposed to.  All these factors together are
responsible for the empowerment process.
The nature and types of activities and
programmes that the women are
exposed to critically determine how
empowering the impact of the SHG is
on women. The minimalist microfinance
approach is not sufficient. An important
direction for future research, that we are
currently working with is to find which of
these factors have a greater impact
on empowering women.
R. Bali Swain and F. Yang Wallentin:
Does Microfinance Empower Women?
Evidence from Self Help Groups in India.
Uppsala Universitet, Dept. of Economics
Working Paper 2007:24. @





respect and esteem.22 International Poverty Centre
The discussion on empowering
women in microfinance often attracts
opposing views. The debate tends to
crystallise at the point of clearly
attributing impacts to microfinance and
in particular women’s empowerment.
Two seemingly separate issues emerge:
impact on the client and impact on the
microfinance institution (MFI).
It is a fact that microfinance does impact
both the MFI and its clients. Over the
years, tension has been created in terms
of prioritising between these two
impacts. The essence of microfinance
is to create access to useful financial
services for the ultimate purpose of
improving livelihoods. The targeting
of women is important in order to
achieve maximum impact on the family.
MFIs generally agree that gender
dimensions are crucial for designing
and implementing effective
microfinance interventions for
improving livelihoods in a sustainable
manner. Yet, some institutions have not
fully integrated gender issues in their
practical operations largely because of
conflicting priorities.
The priority impact for MFIs is financial
and institutional sustainability. Some
argue that MFIs can reach sustainability
by using the advantage of critical mass
and still empower women, thereby
ensuring congruency of purpose.
However, the question remains to what
extent strategic gender interests can be
achieved while MFIs are focusing on
their own viability.
With the waning of donor funds, MFIs
are under pressure to cover their
operational costs in order to remain in
business. Furthermore, state regulation
has pushed MFIs into the regular
financial sector realm where rules are
more defined and non-compliance
can be severely penalised to the
detriment of the institution. Issues
of the right operational systems,
professionalism and a strong business
case thus come to the fore.
MFIs that have not reached
sustainability are often under pressure
to deliver primarily to that goal such
that gender dimensions take a
background role. Lip service is paid to
this discussion regardless of the other
compelling factors that suggest that
gender-sensitive financial products
can actually improve the bottom line
of the institution.
The older MFIs were often donor-driven;
they focused on the impacts on the
client and therefore on outreach, as
illustrated in the chart. However,
some did not espouse strict
accountability and operational rigour.
Regulation and commercialisation then
necessitated significant changes in the
way MFIs operate. These involve
enhancing a culture of sustainability,
embracing professionalism and securing
funding from commercial sources for
continued business.
The main concern of poor women is
to provide a livelihood for the family.
They often lack the entrepreneurial skills
neded to make it in the marketplace.
In some cases, they have positioned
themselves in saturated markets with
scanty preparation for their work. Most
businesses involve petty trading with
very short term prospects; the
performance is often dismal.
A study in Zambia showed that those
entrepreneurs who had the necessary
Microfinance has separate
impacts on the client and
on the microfinance
institution (MFI).
A tension has been created
in terms of prioritising
between these two impacts.
MFIs that have not reached
sustainability are often
under pressure to deliver
primarily to that goal;
gender concerns
take a background role.
Donor engagement is
needed to help struggling
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training and business know-how
managed to grow their businesses.
On the other hand, women-run
businesses in Zambia showed the
shortest life cycle, averaging four years.
This was attributed largely to the low
education and experience levels of the
entrepreneur. This could be true in other
environments as well.
There are also contextual connotations
to this aspect. Where culturally the
husband is expected to go off to work
and earn a living for the rest of the family,
a woman’s contribution is regarded as
merely supplementing that effort. Even
where a husband is no longer in gainful
employment, the woman’s effort may still
not be viewed as a long-term means of
sustaining the family.
Hence, the woman’s business is driven
by that level of ambition: as a stop-gap
measure. It is almost as if there is a glass
ceiling and the business can only go so far.
Some clients rarely take time to reflect
on how best to utilise borrowed funds.
This often leads to delinquency,
reducing their chances of getting new
loans. Most MFIs lend mainly to women,
who have higher default and drop-out
rates. In this case, business development
services might be the logical process to
get clients more focused on growth.
MFIs who are focusing on their own
sustainablitiy may not integrate this
enough into their work.
General market conditions affect
the viability of the enterprise. In a
stagnating economy, market vibrancy is
lacking and the micro-businesses suffer.
Where markets are seasonal, clients will
lead a hand-to-mouth existence. Studies
show that it is often the women clients
who will be most affected by market
instability. Reducing lending does not
help resolve this problem; it simply
helps the MFI to manage its portfolio.
The microfinance sector in Zambia has
not grown to expectation. A gender
audit of the two main microfinance
institutions in Zambia showed that
both had received feedback from clients.
But how useful was this for addressing
organisational as well as client issues
from a gender perspective?
Issues of weaning off donor support and
reaching sustainability in the financial
markets are topmost—not a combined
strategy that includes gender
dimensions. Since the Central Bank
introduced microfinance regulations,
MFI management tends to prioritise
sustainability and regulatory observance.
This limits the utility of gender audits,
beyond providing useful information.
The key reason for this is that their
findings call for efforts to improve
outcomes on clients’ lives, without
making the link to how this will
positively impact the institution’s bottom
line. Yet, management is often appraised
on their ability to develop the institution
and not so much on the client impact.
Thus, the gender audit does not address
the key institutional issues.
Studies from Ethiopia show that
targeting for specific impact can actually
produce desired results. Gender-
disaggregated data show specific
impacts on women. The question is
how this information is used to inform
decisions on how to serve poor people
from a gender perspective that will also
improve the MFI.
For instance, although 83 per cent of
the rural population of Zambia are poor,
they have least access to microfinance.
The incidence of poverty in female-
headed households is significantly
higher than in male-headed households
Thus, a large segment of poor women
are not served.
There is evidence that it is possible
to run profitable institutions that are
targeting women. To ensure this, MFIs
need to fully engage with gender issues;
not merely promoting women’s issues,
but taking a holistic approach to
differentiating product composition
and delivery to meet identified needs
of both women and men.
Donor engagement is needed to help
struggling MFIs adopt a mutually
compatible focus of gender
differentiation and organisational
viability. Those MFIs that have successfully
integrated gender in their work and are
having institutional bottom line successes
should be encouraged to provide learning
lessons for those that are struggling.
I. Mutalima: Microfinance and Gender
Equality: Are we getting there?
The Southern African Regional












Concerns focused more on outreach and
impacts. While institutional sustainability
was expected, slippages occurred
and in some cases a trend/culture
was established.
Bottom line issues came to the fore
and product ranges were examined
for profitability. Products and
processes that did not support
the bottom line were not favoured.
As above, MFIs concentrate on
improving their operating processes
to meet regulatory requirements.
Following the waning of grant funding,
MFIs definitely favour profitable
products. Engagements with other
issues like gender are relegated
to the background.24 International Poverty Centre
The term ‘feminisation of poverty’
refers to an increase in the relative levels
of poverty among women and/or female
headed households. It deserves special
attention from policy makers since it is
related to two negative phenomena:
gender inequality and poverty. Given
that the increase of poverty among a
social group tends to set priorities for
public policies, in the last decade the
discourse on feminisation has had some
impact on the agenda to promote
gender equality in the economic sphere.
This, however, comes at the risk of
collapsing the broader gender inequality
concerns into a pure poverty agenda.
Based on the available evidence about
Latin America and some developed
countries, this article briefly reviews
whether there really is a generalised
feminisation of income poverty.
Irrespective of this,  we argue that
poverty—as currently measured—captures
only a small part of important gender
inequalities in the economic sphere.
Much has been said about a feminisation
of poverty in the world. But such a
feminisation should not be confused
with higher levels of poverty among
women or female-headed households.
The term ‘feminisation’ relates to the way
poverty changes over time, whereas
‘higher levels of poverty’ refers to the
levels of poverty at a given moment; it
includes the so-called overrepresentation
among the poor. Thus, feminisation is a
process while ‘higher poverty’ is a state.
So, is there a generalised feminisation
of poverty in the world? No one really
knows. There are not many empirical
studies about this subject and, of
course, a conclusive answer to this
question depends on a comprehensive
analysis based on data including several
regions of the world. Yet the existing
information about the Americas and
Western Europe points in the direction
of a negative answer.
The first study identifying a feminisation
of income poverty was about the USA,
covering a period from the 1950s to the
1970s. Other studies followed, some of
them arguing that such a feminisation
did not happen in the USA in the 1960s,
‘70s and ‘80s. Likewise, studies of the
United Kingdom found no evidence of
a relative increase in the poverty among
women or female-headed households
between the 1970s and 1980s. In Canada,
a worsening of the gender gap in
poverty indicators was found for the
period 1973-1990 if one compares
female-headed with male-headed
households, but not if the focus turns
to an overall women-men comparison.
Our study found no evidence of a
feminisation of income poverty in the
1990s in the countries that together
encompass the large majority of the
population of Latin America. This result
holds for different definitions of
feminisation of poverty and for various
poverty lines and assumptions about
intra-household inequality. Out of
eight countries, including all the most
populous ones, only in two—post-crisis
Argentina and Mexico—a relative
worsening of poverty indicators for
female-headed households was found,
but even in these countries no relevant
differences were identified in overall
women-men comparisons.
Reviewing several studies we found that
the overrepresentation of women or
female-headed households among
the poor is a much more common
phenomenon than the feminisation of
poverty. However, although higher levels
of income poverty among these groups
occur in many countries, this is not a
by Marcelo Medeiros and Joana Costa,
International Poverty Centre
The international discourse
on feminisation has had an
impact on the agenda to
promote gender equality.
Higher static levels of
poverty among women is
much more  common than a
dynamic process of
feminisation of poverty.
The real levels of poverty
among women are likely





capture only a small part
of gender inequalities, but
not the important lack of
economic autonomy
of women.
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general rule. Even in developing
countries there is no rigid connection
between the sex of the head of the
household and poverty. In fact, poverty
seems to be more correlated with
the presence of children in the family
and other characteristics of the
household members.
A review of studies about developed and
transition economies shows that there
was a high degree of over-representation
of female headed households in poverty
in Canada, Australia, Russia, USA and
Germany in the 1990s; a higher incidence
of poverty among women was identified
in the 1980s in USA, Australia, Germany,
Canada and UK, but not in Spain.
In developing countries, studies indicate
that female-headed households are
more likely to be in poverty in Brazil
and in urban India but not in six Sub-
Saharan African countries, three Asian
countries and thirteen other Latin
American countries. One review
comparing 61 country studies found
that in 38 of them there was an
overrepresentation of female-headed
households among the poor, and in
15 of them some kind of relationship
between certain types of female headship
and poverty. However,  in eight of these
countries it did not find any such links.
The conclusion of another review, based on
more than one hundred country studies,
is that only in certain countries do the
female-headed households consistently
present worse poverty indicators.
Most studies are based on surveys
of income or consumption at the
household level. Invariably they neglect
any inequalities in the distribution of
income within the households. However,
from a gender perspective, such an
implicit assumption of perfect distribution
can be disputed. There is no reason to
believe that the factors that determine
gender inequalities in the public sphere
will not act within the families.
On the contrary, despite the scarcity of
data to support such research, the very
few studies available about this subject
present some evidence of significant
intra-household inequalities. They
identified differences in the final
allocation of economic resources among
family members, usually favouring men.
If intra-household inequalities were taken
into consideration, we would probably
find that the current figures of the levels
of income or consumption poverty
among women are underestimated.
Everything indicates that the real levels
of poverty among women are higher
than the ones commonly presented.
However, these data for developing
countries are so limited that one will
hardly be able to correctly estimate
how much higher these levels are.
The inclusion of intra-household
inequalities in the analysis of the
feminisation of poverty seems to be an
unlikely scenario for the near future, as
this would require the measurement of
these inequalities in more than one
point in time. But, differently from the
issue of overrepresentation, such an
inclusion would not necessarily show
that the feminisation is underestimated.
What matters for the feminisation is not
the level of intra-household inequality
but an increase in the bias against
women. As the situation of women
in many developing countries has
improved in the last decades relative to
that of men, the result of this inclusion
would probably be in the opposite
direction, that is, of a reduction of
the feminisation of poverty if intra-
household inequalities were considered.
This brings forward an important issue,
both from the theoretical and practical
points of view: poverty as usually
measured should not be our priority
guide to gender equity actions.
Although we frequently conceive poverty
at the individual level, our measurement
in effect occurs at the household level.
The practice among researchers is usually
to measure total family income or
consumption, or the satisfaction of basic
needs by households, and then to divide
it by the number of persons in these
households to come up with per capita
estimates. Thus, the unit of analysis of
poverty is the household.
However, inequalities between men and
women cannot be studied having only
the households as the unit of analysis,
as it tends to mask much of the
dynamics of the relations between
individuals. Even if we narrow the
debate of gender equity to the
economic sphere, from the perspective
of gender relations it matters not only
how much a woman can consume but
also how she achieves the power to
consume. Often, poverty research merely
calculates the expected consumption
per household member—more exactly,
a simple or weighted average of the
family income or observed consumption
—thus neglecting how the economic
power within the household is structured.
Many have taken the feminisation of
poverty as a global fact. Of course, the
term can be used to express different
concepts, but in the sense of a worsening
of the situation of women in relation to
that of men—or female-headed versus
male-headed households—there is
no clear evidence of a widespread
feminisation of poverty in the world.
And while finding higher levels of
poverty among women or female-
headed households is far more common
than finding a gender bias in the
evolution of poverty over time, this
is not a universal phenomenon either.
Beyond that, we have to question the
degree of importance we should give
to these issues. There is no doubt that
poverty should occupy a prominent
position in the political agenda, but the
concerns about a feminisation of poverty
or the overrepresentation of women
among the poor should not overshadow
the debate on gender inequality.
When we talk about poverty in the way
we currently measure it, we are using a
concept that captures only a small part
of important gender inequalities. It
seems that both researchers and policy
makers would gain from focusing on
related but different issues, such as the
lack of economic autonomy of women.
M. Medeiros and J. Costa: Is There a
Feminization of Poverty in Latin America?
In Press, World Development (2007),
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.02.011.
A preliminary version is available at
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/
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The ‘feminisation of poverty’ has
traditionally been viewed as a global
phenomenon, and associated with three
apparently intuitive notions. These are
first, that women are poorer than men;
second, that the incidence of poverty
among women is increasing relative to
men over time, and third, that growing
poverty among women is linked with the
‘feminisation’ of household headship.
While a now quite substantial body of
research has cast doubt on the last of
these assumptions, the other two are still
treated as somewhat self-evident. This is
despite serious conceptual and/or
empirical problems with both. For
example, the first assertion—that women
are poorer than men—is static, and
therefore anomalous within a construct
whose very nomenclature implies
dynamism. While the latter is highlighted
in the second tenet, it is virtually
impossible to establish whether gender
gaps in poverty are widening given a
dearth of sex-disaggregated panel data.
On top of this, no consistent trend in
this direction is verified by the limited
statistical evidence actually available
(see above, p. 24-25). Beyond these caveats,
there is arguably a bigger problem still
with the ‘feminisation of poverty’, namely
its implicit emphasis on incomes.
That the ‘feminisation of poverty’ has
been associated primarily, if not
exclusively, with income, appears rather
at odds with the wider literature on
gender and development, in which there
has been growing support for concepts
and measures which encapsulate
poverty’s multidimensionality, and,
via participatory methods, attempt
to incorporate the ‘voices of the poor’
themselves. The relevance of more
holistic and subjective perspectives
is eminently apparent in recent
investigation into the ‘feminisation of
poverty’ undertaken in The Gambia, the
Philippines and Costa Rica. In addition
to examining statistical and policy
documents, this comparative research
drew on interviews and focus group
discussions with over 200 low-income
women and men of different ages, and
consultations with 40 professionals
working in international organisations,
state agencies and NGOs.
Although there was no consistent
quantitative or qualitative evidence to
support a generalised tendency to a
‘feminisation’ of income poverty, one
striking trend across the three case study
countries was what is perhaps best
summed-up as a ‘feminisation of
responsibility and/or obligation’.
This notion rests on three main
observations. The first pertains to
growing gender disparities in the
range and amount of labour invested
in household livelihoods. While rising
numbers of poor women of all ages are
working outside the home, as well as
continuing to perform the bulk of
unpaid domestic and care work, men are
not increasing their participation in such
work despite a declining role as sole or
chief earners in households. That this
growing unevenness in gendered inputs
to household livelihoods is occurring
in a context where neo-liberal
restructuring is frequently requiring
greater investments of time in all forms
of labour, including self-provisioning,
raises serious concerns about inequality,
exploitation and sustainability.
My second main observation relates
to persistent and/or growing disparities
in women’s and men’s capacities to
negotiate gendered obligations and
entitlements in households. Despite
women’s progressive movements to the
frontline of coping with poverty, they do
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not seem to have gained any ground for
negotiating greater inputs to household
incomes or labour on the part of men, let
alone reductions in men’s resource-
depleting activities.
Indeed, regardless of their declining
shares of household effort, many men
continue to withhold earnings—and/or
to appropriate those of  wives or other
household members—to fund extra-
domestic, and fundamentally self-
oriented pursuits such as spending time
with male companions, drinking, taking
drugs, engaging in extra-marital sex and/
or gambling. Since women have little
choice, especially where idealised norms
of femininity continue to emphasise
altruism and the primacy of family care,
men’s extra-domestic indulgences not
only reinforce women’s obligations, but
can, in the process, exacerbate them.
For example, illness or incapacity induced
by risk-taking behaviour can deprive
household members of economic
resources through losses in earnings
and medical expenditure.
A third distinctive pattern across the
case study countries is an increasing
disarticulation between investments/
responsibilities and rewards/rights.
While the onus of dealing with poverty is
becoming progressively feminised, there
is no obvious increase in women’s rights
and rewards—whether of a material or
non-material nature. Gambian, Filipino
and Costa Rican women frequently stress
that they are working harder in and
outside the home.  However, unless they
head their own households, rarely do
they claim that this has entitled them to
any benefits such as more personal over
collective expenditure, more freedom, or
license to pursue goals which might be
construed as individualistic.
Indeed, in most cases women appear to
see no justification to expect or demand
more as a result of giving more. This is
even the case with young women
who are undoubtedly the biggest
beneficiaries of institutional attempts
to level the gender playing field
in such areas as education and
employment.  While young women’s
growing personal asset base might be
expected to strengthen their bargaining
power and aspirations, potential gains
are frequently circumscribed by social
and familial constraints. Young women’s
higher earning capacity, for example,
does not necessarily enable them to
negotiate new deals within households,
but can instead expose them to more
claims. This is especially the case in
The Gambia.
On the other side of the fence, men,
despite their lesser inputs to household
livelihoods, are managing to retain their
traditional privileges and prerogatives,
including the exercise of authority,
distancing from the time and labour
efforts necessary for household survival,
and recourse to resource-draining
‘escape routes’. The scenario whereby
investments are becoming progressively
detached from rights and rewards could
conceivably evolve into new and deeper
forms of gender inequality, and, as such,
is a matter of profound concern.
The above findings also raise important
questions about the relevance of the
‘feminisation of poverty’, which, in
respect of its current referents, does not
seem to capture the essence of where
poor women’s most significant
contemporary privations lie. Gendered
poverty goes far beyond the question
of income, with a broader perspective
on poverty also indicating that the
‘feminisation’ of privation may owe
more to the actual and idealised
majority position of male household
headship than a rise in the numbers
of households headed by women.
On balance, the notion that poverty is
‘feminising’ might only be sustained if
inputs are given as much emphasis as
income, and due attention is paid to their
subjective and objective corollaries. The
mounting onus on women to cope with
household survival arises not only
because they cannot necessarily rely on
men and/or do not expect to rely on men,
but because a growing number seem to
be supporting men as well—whether
through income or labour contributions.
This underlines the argument that
poverty is not just about the privation
of minimum basic needs, but of
opportunities and choices1. While on
one hand female household heads could
conceivably be seen as an extreme case
of ‘choicelessness’ and ‘responsibility’—in
having little option other than to fend
for themselves and their dependents,
and on potentially weaker grounds
given gender discrimination in society
at large, this needs to be qualified:
a) because female-headed households
do not necessarily lack male members;
b) free of a senior male ‘patriarch’, their
households can become ‘enabling spaces’
in which there is scope to distribute
household tasks and resources more
equitably, and c) women in male-headed
households may be in the position of
supporting not only children, but
spouses as well, as an increasing
proportion of men seem to be stepping
out of the shoes of ‘chief breadwinner’
into those of ‘chief spender’.
If classic conceptualisations of the
‘feminisation of poverty’ are
methodologically and analytically
inappropriate in depicting trends in
gendered privation, this arguably leaves
us with two choices.  One is that existing
terminology is abandoned, and perhaps
substituted by something akin to a
‘feminisation of responsibility and/or
obligation’.  The second is that the term
is retained with the proviso that the
poverty part of the construct refers
not just to income but other, albeit
related, privations.
The latter is conceivably preferable: first,
because the ‘feminisation of poverty’ is
succinct, well-known, and has already
gone some way to ‘en-gender’ poverty
reduction strategies, and second
because giving poverty a more explicit
multidimensional emphasis would bring
it more in line with poverty discourses
in general.  Provided it is made patently
clear that poverty is not just about
incomes, but inputs, the ‘feminisation of
poverty’ would have greater theoretical
and empirical resonance.  It would
also provide a better basis for policy
interventions which in the process of
directing poverty reduction programmes
to, and or through, women, can simply
add to the disproportionate burdens
they are currently carrying.
S. Chant: Gender, Generation and Poverty:
Exploring the ‘Feminisation of Poverty’
in Africa, Asia and Latin America
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